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1 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM AND THE  
LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
Zachary D. Clopton* 
On February 23 of this year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invali-
dated a California statute permitting victims of the Armenian genocide to 
file insurance claims, finding that the state’s use of the label “Genocide” 
intruded on the federal government’s conduct of foreign affairs.1 This deci-
sion, Movsesian v. Versicherung AG, addresses foreign affairs federalism—the 
division of authority between the states and the federal government. Just one 
month later, the Supreme Court weighed in on another foreign affairs issue: 
the separation of foreign relations powers within the federal government. In 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Supreme Court ordered the lower courts to help 
referee a conflict between the executive and legislative branches of the fed-
eral government concerning how Jerusalem-born American citizens list their 
country of birth on their passports.2 The former case presented an issue of 
federalism and the latter an issue of separation of powers; yet both cases 
sought to delineate foreign affairs authority in the United States.  
This Essay addresses the relationship between the states and the federal 
executive in foreign affairs—a federalism question—in light of coming sep-
aration-of-powers decisions. Part I briefly outlines foreign affairs 
federalism: how far into foreign affairs may states reach without stepping 
into the federal government’s exclusive terrain? Part II looks at a particular 
permutation of this federalism debate, examining the conflict between the 
states and the national executive. Movsesian, the Armenian genocide case, 
highlights this state–executive clash. The panel and en banc opinions in 
Movsesian offered two different approaches to this federalism question, both 
of which present textual and practical difficulties. Having laid out the prob-
lems with these approaches, Part III looks for answers in an unlikely place: 
decisions about the separation of powers within the federal government. In 
Zivotofsky, the Supreme Court called for increased judicial participation in 
contests between Congress and the President in foreign affairs. This com-
mand will produce a body of law defining the sphere of exclusive executive 
authority vis-à-vis Congress. Synthesizing these decisions, Part IV argues 
that, for structural and pragmatic reasons, courts should bar states as well as 
Congress from this exclusive executive sphere. The Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                                      
 * Assistant United States Attorney, Civil Division, Northern District of Illinois, and 
Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. The views expressed in this Essay are 
those of the author alone and do not represent the views of the United States or the Depart-
ment of Justice. I am grateful for the assistance of the Michigan Law Review, Roger P. Alford, 
Michael D. Ramsey, and Katherine D. Kinzler. 
 1. Movsesian v. Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacating 
629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010). See infra Part II. 
 2. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). See infra Part III. 
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called upon the courts to articulate the boundaries of executive and legisla-
tive authority within the federal government, but in so doing, the courts 
indirectly will provide guidance about the division between the federal gov-
ernment and the states.3 
I. Foreign Affairs Federalism 
It is undisputed that states do not exercise unlimited powers in foreign 
affairs. The Constitution expressly proscribes some state conduct.4 In addi-
tion, courts elevate national interests over state-level foreign policy through 
two broad doctrinal categories: preemption and the so-called dormant doc-
trines. 
Preemption is a creature of the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy 
Clause declares that the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and trea-
ties are the supreme law of the land—i.e., they trump state law.5 
Straightforwardly, Congress may pass laws that contain expressly preemp-
tive language.6 Courts also may find a state law impliedly preempted where 
federal and state law conflict (“conflict preemption”), where the state law 
creates an obstacle to the federal purpose (“obstacle preemption”), or where 
Congress has occupied the entire field (“field preemption”).7 While these 
                                                                                                                      
 3. With no disrespect meant to those authors and articles not listed, readers curious to 
learn more about foreign affairs federalism are encouraged to consult Matthew Schaefer, Con-
straints on State-Level Foreign Policy: (Re)Justifying, Refining and Distinguishing the 
Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine, 41 Seton Hall L. Rev. 201 (2011); Carlos M. Vázquez, 
Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate 
Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1495 (2011); Mi-
chael D. Ramsey, International Wrongs, State Laws and Presidential Policies, 32 Loy. L.A. 
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 19 (2010); Michael Aaron Granne, Two-Dimensional Federalism and 
Foreign Affairs Preemption, 44 Val. U. L. Rev. 863 (2010); Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford 
R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2009); Bradford R. 
Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1321 (2001); Ern-
est A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 139 (2001); Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 175 (2000) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption]; 
Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding 
of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 341 (1999) [hereinafter “Ramsey, 
Power of States”]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 (1997); 
Richard Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 821 
(1989). 
 4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. 
 5. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 6. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006), discussed in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 
85 (1983). On the flip side, Congress occasionally has passed laws expressly permitting state 
action in foreign policy. See, e.g., Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act, Pub. L. No. 110–
174, 121 Stat. 2516 (2007). 
 7. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, 2012 WL 2368661 (U.S. June 25, 
2012); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). For a helpful chart of 
these and other federalism doctrines relevant to foreign affairs, see Goldsmith, Statutory For-
eign Affairs Preemption, supra note 3, at 202. 
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preemption modes vary in manifold ways, each relies on particular enact-
ments at the federal level to trump the state laws. 
States also may be excluded from foreign affairs lawmaking through the 
dormant foreign commerce clause and dormant foreign affairs doctrine. 
These “dormant” doctrines infer from the Constitution’s allocation of au-
thority to the federal government that states are prohibited from burdening 
the federal government’s responsibility in certain areas. The dormant foreign 
commerce clause, derived from Congress’s Article I authority to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations,” means that states cannot take steps that 
impermissibly burden or discriminate against foreign commerce.8 The 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine, like the constitutional foreign affairs power 
itself, is more elusive—although the Constitution does not expressly allocate 
foreign affairs powers to the federal government, some judicial decisions 
locate an exclusive national power in the constellation of foreign affairs 
clauses combined with a historical gloss. Most famously, in Zschernig v. 
Miller, the Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon probate law as an imper-
missible “intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the 
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.”9 Zschernig remains 
the strongest articulation of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine by the Su-
preme Court. 
These federalism threads—preemption and the dormant doctrines—have 
led to numerous debates, two broad classes of which are relevant here. First, 
which federal actions preempt state law?10 A literal reading of the Suprema-
cy Clause suggests that only the Constitution, federal law, or a treaty has the 
power to preempt. But what about international law, which is “part of our 
law”?11 What about sole executive agreements12 or regulations?13 The 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine produces the second class of debates. Not-
withstanding a positive citation to Zschernig in the Supreme Court’s 2003 
Garamendi decision, there is doubt about Zschernig’s continuing validity. 
And, to the degree that a dormant foreign affairs doctrine exists, there is ongo-
ing debate about the breadth and effect of that doctrine.14 To use a cliché, in 
                                                                                                                      
 8. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Barclays Bank PLC v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
 9. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the Su-
preme Court blurred the line between field preemption and the dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003), and the Ninth Circuit repeated this pattern in the en 
banc Movsesian opinion. But these doctrines are conceptually different: field preemption re-
quires federal action (one that occupies the field), while the dormant foreign affairs doctrine 
requires no such federal step. See, e.g., Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 121 S. Ct. 1261 
(2012) (discussing field preemption arising out of the Locomotive Inspection Act). 
 10. For a helpful summary of the scholarly debates, see Vázquez, supra note 3. 
 11. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 12. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); see also Garamendi, 539 U.S. 
396; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 13. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985). 
 14. For a recent entrant into the Zschernig debate, see Schaefer, supra note 3. 
Clopton MLR FI FTP 1.doc 9/27/2012 11:17 AM 
4 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 111:1 
this globalized era, how can courts define what is or is not “foreign af-
fairs”?15 
Although the debates about preemption and the dormant doctrine in-
volve different textual provisions, they often run together. To ensure that the 
federal government is the “one voice” in foreign affairs,16 critics of state-
level foreign policy are likely to apply a capacious view of preemption and 
to support a more muscular dormant foreign affairs doctrine. These one-
voice advocates worry that a single state’s action could provoke retaliation 
against the whole country,17 and they invoke the supposedly superior experi-
ence and expertise of the federal government in foreign affairs.18 State 
backers, meanwhile, argue that state participation results in better and more 
democratic foreign policy19 and that concerns about retaliation are over-
blown, as foreign governments can target individual states.20 Again, these 
arguments play out in both preemption and the dormant doctrines. 
II. MOVSESIAN: Executive Preemption? 
The previous Part posed two foreign policy federalism questions: in 
short, what preempts and whither Zschernig? These questions represent fed-
eral–state clashes, but the federal government is not a monolith. Of interest 
to this Essay is the class of cases in which federal executive authority comes 
into contact with the states. Both preemption and the dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine may be relevant to these cases.21 
The Ninth Circuit’s Armenian genocide case highlights these issues.22 In 
2000, California adopted a statute permitting courts to entertain insurance 
claims brought by “Armenian Genocide victim[s]” and extending the statute 
                                                                                                                      
 15. Or, as the Court has said in another context, it cannot be the case that “every case or 
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942). 
 17. Most famously, Alexander Hamilton wrote that “the peace of the WHOLE ought 
not to be left at the disposal of a PART.” The Federalist No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 18. For better or worse, this view lends itself to foreign policy exceptionalism. See 
Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1089, 1104–
07 (1999). 
 19. E.g., Bilder, supra note 3, at 828–29. 
 20. E.g., Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 Ohio 
St. L.J. 649 (2002). 
 21. This Essay focuses on the conflict between presidential foreign affairs policy and 
the states. It does not consider the related question of regulatory or agency preemption, which 
also could fall under the umbrella of “executive preemption.” For an excellent set of articles 
on this topic, see the Northwestern University Law Review’s Symposium on Ordering State–
Federal Relations through Federal Preemption Doctrine, published at 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503 
(2008). See also Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption against 
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 253 (2012). 
 22. Movsesian v. Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacating 
629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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of limitations on such claims.23 Potential claimants (including Movsesian) 
filed a class action against insurers. As part of their defense, the insurance 
companies claimed that the law was an invalid exercise of foreign affairs 
powers by the state. 
At the panel level, the “what preempts” debate took center stage. De-
fendants argued that an executive foreign policy of declining to 
acknowledge the Armenian genocide preempted the California law. Execu-
tive policymaking is not included in the Supremacy Clause’s list of 
preemptive federal enactments, but all three judges on the panel accepted 
the possibility of executive preemption, even though the judges disagreed on 
whether executive preemption occurred in this particular instance. The two-
judge majority blessed the law because there was no clear executive policy 
against recognizing the Armenian genocide, while the dissent identified a 
“clear Presidential foreign policy” that preempted the California law.24 
The problem with both the majority and dissenting opinions is that there 
is no such thing as executive preemption. Preemption works where the Su-
premacy Clause stamps out state action, and the Supremacy Clause 
identifies only the Constitution, federal law, and treaties as preemptive. 
While there may be some debate over what constitutes federal law, there is 
no doubt that an executive statement of policy does not fit into any of these 
categories.25 Constitutional history and political realities reject the notion 
that the President can veto state laws by fiat.26 
The practicalities also weigh against so-called executive preemption. It 
is simply impractical for courts to wade through the piles of statements of 
executive officials from various administrations, various parties, various 
agencies, and various contexts. The dueling panel opinions in Movsesian 
reveal the difficulty of this task. Furthermore, in diplomacy, sometimes inac-
tion is as important as action. Thus, to adopt the notion of executive 
preemption, courts must either ignore this discretion-as-diplomacy piece or 
they must add executive silence to the Augean stable of potential executive 
policy sources. And even in this view, the President always has the option of 
asking Congress to codify any executive policy for which a preemptive ef-
fect is desired.27 
The foregoing arguments address executive preemption, not the division 
of power between the federal government and the states more broadly. The 
textual argument here is that executive policy is not encompassed by the 
Supremacy Clause, but Congress can pass statutes to the same effect. On the 
                                                                                                                      
 23. Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 354.4 (West 2011). 
 24. 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012). For an excel-
lent survey of executive claims of lawmaking authority, see Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive 
Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 309 (2006). 
 25. For persuasive arguments in favor of the literal reading, see, e.g., Clark, supra note 
3; Ramsey, Power of States, supra note 3; Bellia & Clark, supra note 3. 
 26. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 27. See, e.g., Ramsey, Power of States, supra note 3 (discussing the negative on state 
laws). 
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practical side, while the United States Code is extensive, it is a finite, man-
ageable set of documents for courts to examine. And Congress, unlike the 
executive, is not responsible for the covert and discrete actions that some-
times comprise modern diplomacy—Congress is a public body and its 
public acts (laws and ratified treaties) can be identified readily. At the same 
time, the rejection of executive preemption does not give states carte 
blanche. Congress and the President always can preempt state laws together, 
and opponents of state foreign policy can fall back on the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine, which avoids the textual and practical problems of execu-
tive preemption. 
Indeed, the Movsesian en banc opinion eschewed executive preemption 
in favor of this approach. The en banc court cited approvingly to Zschernig 
and held that a state law was invalid if (1) it was not within an area of tradi-
tional state responsibility and (2) it intruded on exclusive national authority 
to manage foreign affairs.28 The court looked to the law’s purpose to answer 
the former requirement—it concluded that California had a foreign affairs 
purpose, not a traditional state one. And the court found that the Armenian 
genocide law impermissibly intruded on federal foreign affairs power, alt-
hough it did not offer any clear, bounded definition of that exclusive federal 
area. This lack of a definition is exactly the problem that scholars associate 
with Zschernig. Not only is the constitutional basis for the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine thin, but there is no coherent rule for drawing the line 
around “foreign affairs.”29 Some limitation must be placed on this doctrine, 
but at least in this case, no clear limit was offered.  
III. ZIVOTOFSKY: Exclusive Executive Authority? 
Although the United States was quick to recognize the new government 
of Israel in 1948, the U.S. government also adopted a policy of declining to 
recognize Israel’s (or anyone’s) sovereignty over Jerusalem. As part of that 
policy, the passports of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem do not provide a 
country of birth—they list only “Jerusalem.” In 2002, Congress passed a 
statute that required the Secretary of State to list “Jerusalem, Israel” on the 
passport of any U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem who so requested. The execu-
tive branch refused.  
                                                                                                                      
 28. The court, following Garamendi, referred to this approach as both field preemption 
and the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, losing sight of the distinction discussed above. See 
supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 29. See, e.g., Roger Alford, Ninth Circuit Embraces Foreign Affairs Field Preemption, 
Opinio Juris (Feb. 24, 2012, 4:33 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/02/24/ninth-circuit-
embraces-foreign-affairs-field-preemption (suggesting that the Movsesian en banc opinion’s 
logic could invalidate “long-arm statutes to address libel tourism, state laws regulating drug 
trafficking at international borders, ad hoc state tax credits to promote targeted foreign direct 
investment, emergency state funds for the benefit of Japanese tsunami victims, or state pension 
divestment rules such as those applied to address South African apartheid”). This is true even 
if the opinion is read to apply a limited “purpose-review” standard. See Shaeffer, supra note 3 
(advocating for this position). 
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Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem in 2002. 
Through his parents, Zivotofsky sued for the right to have “Jerusalem, Isra-
el” on his passport. The executive branch argued that the Constitution gives 
it exclusive authority in certain areas of foreign relations—although various 
definitions of this executive authority exist, in the Executive’s view, any 
proper definition includes the diplomatic and administrative duties of pass-
port management. Zivotofsky claimed that the 2002 statute controlled 
passport-naming conventions, thus arguing on behalf of Congress’s rightful 
authority in this area. 
The district court and court of appeals decided that Zivotofsky’s claim 
presented a nonjusticiable political question, thereby declining to resolve the 
separation-of-powers dispute. The Supreme Court, however, permitted no 
such passivity. Eight Justices agreed that the lower courts had the capacity 
and the duty to weigh in on the dispute, and so the case has been returned to 
the lower courts to determine whether the issuance of passports is within the 
scope of exclusively executive authority or whether a duly enacted law can 
constrain the executive in this sphere.30 While there is no dispute that some 
narrow zone of exclusive executive authority exists—for example, the presi-
dential power to “receive Ambassadors” is absolute31—the lower courts 
addressing Zivotofsky and other similar cases will have the opportunity to 
engage substantively with separation-of-powers issues and (presumably) to 
develop legal rules defining legislative and executive authority in foreign 
affairs. 
IV. ZIVOTOFSKY and MOVSESIAN: A Synthesis 
Zivotofsky is not a federalism case, yet it portends important insights for 
federalism cases like Movsesian. Critics of executive preemption argue that 
the executive should ask Congress to preempt any supposedly interfering 
state law. But following Zivotofsky, lower courts will define areas of exclu-
sive executive control insulated from Congress. This separation-of-powers 
limit on Congress has consequences for federalism as well: barring congres-
sional action in an area of executive authority means that preemption by 
statute is not an option. But it would be odd to suggest that that states have 
free reign on topics exclusively designated for executive control.  
That leaves the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, but now with a struc-
turally defined limit—a dormant constitutional authority steps into the 
breach only where statutory preemption is not an option (i.e., topics exclu-
sively assigned to the executive).32 To put it another way, once the courts 
define the sphere of exclusive executive authority vis-à-vis Congress, they 
                                                                                                                      
 30. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). Justice Breyer 
dissented, arguing that the political question doctrine applied in this case. Id. at 1437–41. 
 31. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
 32. I would hasten to note that this position does not endorse any particular view of 
executive authority—especially an exaggerated one. Rather, this argument supports the limited 
proposition that to the extent that there is a sphere of executive authority exclusive of Con-
gress, that sphere should be exclusive of the states as well. 
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also should invoke an executive-based dormant foreign affairs doctrine with-
in that same limited area. 
This structural case for a dormant authority is supported by practical ar-
guments as well. In Zivotofsky, the Secretary of State argued that the 
Executive’s passport authority, as a part of the recognition authority, must be 
exclusive to avoid sending conflicting messages in the conduct of foreign 
affairs and diplomacy.33 In other words, the Executive is the “one voice” in 
foreign affairs. Indeed, many of the arguments for excluding Congress boil 
down to the practical benefits of the Executive as the “sole organ” in foreign 
affairs however defined. These same arguments apply to federalism—in 
whatever sphere the courts prevent Congress from stepping on the Presi-
dent’s message, the states should be excluded as well.34 
In addition, this limited dormant doctrine should be palatable to most 
combatants in the “executive preemption” debate. Supremacy Clause literal-
ists win the day on preemption—executive policy statements, which do not 
appear in the Supremacy Clause, do not preempt state law. But critics of 
state-level foreign policy succeed in prohibiting some state action: in the 
limited area of executive exclusivity, the states join Congress on the side-
lines. And, because the exclusive executive sphere will be policed by courts 
in the context of executive encroachment on Congress, critics of executive 
authority will not lose any new ground by applying the same standard to 
Congress and to the states.35 While scholars and courts may continue to de-
bate the preemptive effect of other federal government actions or whether 
there is a dormant foreign affairs power that attaches to the federal govern-
ment writ large, the coming separation-of-powers jurisprudence will create a 
small space for agreement in foreign affairs federalism.36 
                                                                                                                      
 33. Brief of Respondent, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 
(2012) (No. 10–699). 
 34. Indeed, the Secretary of State in Zivotofsky relied heavily on federalism decisions to 
support her separation-of-powers argument. See Brief of Respondent, Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. 
1421 (No. 10–699). 
 35. In his excellent Texas Law Review article, Professor Clark argues that federal 
lawmaking rules (e.g., bicameralism and presentment) protect the states better than 
federalism-directed jurisprudence (e.g., Commerce Clause cases). See Clark, supra note 3. 
Of course, one cannot rely on these federal lawmaking rules where there is no federal 
lawmaking—i.e., where the Executive has exclusive authority. 
 36. This argument is not entirely novel, but has not received significant scholarly atten-
tion either. Professor Ramsey makes a powerful case against executive preemption—one that 
this author joined in Part II of this Essay. See Ramsey, Power of States, supra note 3. Professor 
Ramsey’s article touches on the notion of dormant executive power, see id. at 394–96, but the 
thrust of his critique is related to executive preemption. In his Villanova Law Review article, 
Professor Vazquez in passing refers to the notion that the Constitution may free the President 
from the constraints of state laws, but he does not explore this position in detail. See Vazquez, 
supra note 3, at 1294–95, 1313–14. And Professor Van Alstine devotes one paragraph to this 
idea in a much larger article on executive power. See Van Alstine, supra note 3, at 370. Nota-
bly, Professor Vazquez supports a broad view of federal foreign policy supremacy, while 
Professor Ramsey and Professor Van Alstine are critical of too wide a berth for federal execu-
tive power in this realm.  
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That brings us back to the Armenian genocide case. The en banc court 
eschewed the panel’s focus on “executive preemption” and instead conclud-
ed the states are not permitted to engage in foreign policy that intrudes on 
the federal government’s exclusive prerogative. A better approach would 
have been to focus on whether the President had the exclusive authority to 
recognize the Armenian genocide, or whether Congress’s concurrent author-
ity meant that statutory preemption was necessary to trump state law. And it 
will be separation-of-powers cases like Zivotofsky—not federalism cases 
like Zschernig—that will provide an answer. 
